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This paper proposes a growth-oriented dual-income tax by combining an allowance for 
corporate equity with a broadly defined flat tax on personal capital income. Revenue losses 
are compensated by an increase in the value added tax. The paper demonstrates the neutrality 
properties of the reform with respect to investment, firm financial decisions and 
organizational choice. Tax rates are chosen to prevent income shifting from labor to capital 
income. The reform decisively strengthens investment of domestically owned firms as well as 
home and foreign based multinationals and boosts savings. Simulations with a calibrated 
growth model for Switzerland indicate that the reform could add between 2 to 3 percent of 
GDP in the long run, depending on the specific scenario. Given the slow nature of capital 
accumulation, it also imposes considerable costs in the short run. We also consider a tax 
smoothing scenario to offset the intergenerationally redistributive effects. 
JEL Code: D58, D92, E62, G32, H25. 
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The high international mobility of portfolio capital and multinational investments has
rendered the taxation of capital income increasingly diﬃcult. In an open economy,
personal taxes on interest and dividend income not only reduce the volume of savings
but also drive out portfolio capital to other countries. High corporate taxes suppress
investments by domestically owned ﬁrms and deter international direct investments,
since multinational companies face an incentive to locate production in low tax coun-
tries. International direct investment seems to respond more sensitively to taxes than
investment of small and medium sized domestic ﬁrms,1 tempting countries to attract
such investment with favorable tax conditions. Multinational ﬁrms might also shift
proﬁts towards subsidiaries in low tax countries by manipulating transfer prices and
engaging in other activities of international tax arbitrage which erode the domestic tax
base (see Hines, 1999 and Gordon and Hines, 2002 for empirical evidence). Probably
for these reasons, international tax competition has led to a pronounced trend towards
lower corporate tax rates as documented by Devereux, Griﬃth, and Klemm (2002).
The taxation of capital income can not only discourages the level of savings and
investment, but also the allocation of capital towards diﬀerent types of investments
and of savings towards diﬀerent types of assets. Reﬂecting imperfect integration of
corporate and personal income taxes and given special tax preferences, taxation of
income from interest bearing assets, dividends and capital gains is far from uniform.
Further deviations from comprehensive income taxation are found in the tax treatment
of owner occupied housing and of savings for old age insurance. Due to the gov-
ernment’s limited information on foreign activities of domestic tax payers, income on
1Some highly selective references to the empirical literature are Hines (1999), Devereux and Griﬃth
(1998) and de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) on international investment, and Hassett and Hubbard (2002),
Auerbach and Hassett (2003), on domestic investment.
1portfolio capital invested abroad may escape domestic residence based personal taxes
to a considerable extent. In consequence, the distortions in household portfolio com-
position might be as severe as the tax distortion of the level of savings, as the surveys
by Bernheim (2002), Poterba and Samwick (2002) and Poterba (2002) suggest.
Apart from its eﬀect on the level of domestic and inbound foreign investment, the
system of company taxation interferes with an eﬃcient allocation of capital on several
margins. The diﬀerential tax treatment of corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms distorts
the choice of organizational form (MacKie-Mason and Gordon, 1997). Given that the
opportunity cost of equity is not deductible, corporate taxes favor debt over equity
and change the ﬁrms’ capital structure. This tax preference for debt is partly oﬀset
by personal taxes where the investor’s interest income is subject to normal personal
income tax while capital gains are favored by the realization principle or by an explicit
tax preference (Miller, 1977). Next, dividends are often taxed more heavily than capital
gains which prevents payouts (Poterba, 2004). This favors investment by mature ﬁrms
and stands in the way of reallocating capital towards young, fast growing companies
in need for external equity capital. Auerbach and Hassett (2003) emphasize this het-
erogeneity among small and large ﬁrms and ﬁnd that the dividend tax mostly harms
smaller, capital constrained companies. Finally, the relative taxation of capital and la-
bor income can importantly aﬀect the rate of business creation (see Cullen and Gordon,
2002). Tosumup, amoreneutralsystemofcapitalincometaxationmayyieldeﬃciency
gains by eliminating distortions both in the level and allocation of capital.
Most countries formally adhere to, but violate in practice, the concept of compre-
hensive income taxation. A number of countries have switched to taxing parts of
personal capital income separately from other income with a low, ﬂat rate and have
partly moved towards a form of dual income tax. The proponents of a dual income tax
havelistedanumberofreasonsfordiﬀerentialtaxationoflaborandcapitalincomeboth
2onequityandeﬃciencygrounds.2 Fromanequityperspective,personalcapitalincome
taxation leads to a higher tax on future relative to present consumption and thereby
discriminates against savers. In principle, this double taxation of savings calls for a tax
on personal consumption, for example by setting the capital income tax to zero. Under
this view, the distributional objective is already achieved with a progressive labor in-
come tax plus a progressive tax on inheritances and wealth transfers which give rise to
exogenouslyreceivedassetwealthofhouseholds. Amoderatecapitalincometaxcould
be justiﬁed if inheritance or wealth transfer taxes are incomplete for other reasons. A
dual income tax is thus a compromise that helps to limit the double taxation of capital
income on account of simultaneous wealth, capital income and inﬂation taxation in a
non-indexed tax system. A ﬂat rate on comprehensively deﬁned capital income also
fosters horizontal equity in the taxation of diﬀerent types of capital income.
Ongroundsofeconomiceﬃciency,capitalincomeshouldbetaxedlessheavilyifthe
tax base is more sensitive than in the case of labor income. To withstand the pressures
from international tax competition, an open economy should reduce company taxes to
attract mobile ﬁrms and reduce personal taxes to prevent the ﬂight of portfolio capital.
In separating labor and capital income taxation, the dual income tax is thus better
suitedto adjust to internationaltax competition. Aﬂat tax oncomprehensively deﬁned
personal capital income limits costly tax arbitrage activities and thereby reduces the
distortions in the allocation of savings and investments across diﬀerent types of assets.
In this paper, we propose a novel variant of a growth oriented dual income tax.3
For the sake of a short name, we will henceforth call it SDIT as an acronym for Swiss
Dual Income Tax. The reform combines an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) with
2The concept of the Nordic dual income tax was suggested by Sørensen (1994) and further developed
by Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) and Sørensen (1998). Gordon (2000) and Boadway (2004) review the
general issues related to diﬀerential taxation of capital and labor income.
3The reform proposal was developed in Keuschnigg (2004a).
3a dual income tax of the Nordic type. The paper demonstrates the neutrality properties
of the system with respect to investment, ﬁrm ﬁnancial decisions and organizational
choice. The reform strengthens savings and domestic investment of home and foreign
based multinationals. Simulations with a calibrated growth model for Switzerland
indicate that the reform could add between 2.5 to 3.5 percent of GDP in the long-run,
depending on the speciﬁc scenario. Given the slow nature of capital accumulation,
it also imposes considerable costs in the short-run as the revenue shortfalls and the
need to ﬁnance them with other distortionary taxes materialize much faster than the
long-run beneﬁts from induced growth. To oﬀset the intergenerationally redistributive
eﬀects, we compute atax smoothingscenario that endogenouslyusesgovernment debt
to distribute the tax burden evenly among present and future generations.
Our model features a rare degree of detail to allow a more informative quantitative
evaluation than is available in other studies. It captures the diﬀerential eﬀects of tax
reform on four types of ﬁrms: domestically owned corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms,
as well as domestic subsidiaries of home and foreign based multinational ﬁrms that are
listed on international stock markets. Further, the model also endogenizes debt equity
choiceanddividendpayoutbehaviorofcorporationswhichareprimemarginsaﬀected
by most business tax reforms. The European Commission (2001) provides an extensive
compilation of marginal eﬀective tax rates in member countries, diﬀerentiated across
types of ﬁrms and sources of ﬁnance. Our model not only implements these eﬀective
rates in about the same detail, but also allows to quantify the behavioral responses
in general equilibrium when a reform changes tax rates. Finally, household decisions
derive from an overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supply and
an endogenous determination of the level and portfolio composition of savings.4 A
4Assets are imperfect substitutes and allow for small return diﬀerentials that guide the portfolio
composition of households, reﬂecting in part the well documented home bias in international portfolio
diversiﬁcation, see French and Poterba (1991) and Gordon and Gaspar (2001). The average portfolio
4detailed model of household behavior is necessary for at least three reasons: First,
the tax reform proposal shifts taxes from capital to labor and thereby aﬀects work
incentives. Second, the reduction of the personal tax on capital income strengthens
savings incentives. Further, a low tax on personal capital income is motivated in part
to prevent capital ﬂight in an open economy making the portfolio allocation of assets
a central topic. Last, certain capital income taxes aﬀect only part of the business sector
rather than the total economy, as is often assumed in more aggregate studies.
We believe that the present exercise in business tax reform is of interest much
beyond the Swiss case. The overall reform scenario also connects to the US debate on
the economic eﬀects of the recent dividend tax relief of the Bush administration, see
Carroll, Hassett, and Mackie III (2003) and Gravelle (2003). More importantly, given
the extra detail of our quantitative model and our separate evaluation of the various
steps towards a dual income tax, the paper should be informative in considering the
impact of a dual income tax reform as implemented in the Nordic countries. Cnossen
(1999) discusses the dual income tax as a potential model for the European Union.
Variants of a dual income tax were recently suggested for Germany, independently by
the council of economic advisors (Sachverst¨ andigenrat (2003)) and by Sinn (2003). A
quantitative evaluation of these proposals that would consider the diﬀerential impact
on domestically owned versus internationally operating ﬁrms is not yet available.
Although the proposed tax reform is diﬀerent in some important aspects, the insights
of this study should be relevant for these countries as well.
The paper proceeds in section 2 by presenting a precise statement of the main tax
reform proposal and by justifying its structure in the light of the literature on optimal
taxation. Section 3 provides an assessment of the reform proposal for the Swiss case.
We start with a short discussion of the current state of capital income taxation in
return, in contrast, determines the overall level of savings.
5Switzerland and then present an analytical perspective on the economic impact of the
reform, derived from a stylized version of the simulation model. In the following,
we summarize the additional transmission channels present in the simulation model
and present the long-run impact followed by the transitional eﬀects of the reform. A
ﬁnal subsection discusses sensitivity analysis with respect to the strength of the key
behavioral margins. The paper concludes with section 4.
2 A Growth Oriented Dual Income Tax
2.1 The Proposal
To eliminate the present tax distortions in the business sector and to remove the tax
obstacles to growth, a speciﬁc version of a dual income tax is proposed. The SDIT
system (Swiss Dual Income Tax) combines the Nordic type of dual income taxation
with an allowance for corporate equity (ACE). The key thrust of SDIT is to tax capital
income once with a moderate ﬂat rate at the personal level while proﬁts resulting from
a normal return on capital are tax exempt at the company level. Only supernormal
returns such as rents or monopolistic proﬁts are subject to the tax. The proposal is
described and analyzed in full detail in Keuschnigg (2004a). Speciﬁcally, the SDIT
reform rests on ﬁve pillars:
1. Progressive wage taxation as in the status quo (with a top marginal tax rate of
tL = 37%).
2. Proportional proﬁt taxation at a ﬂat tax rate (equal to the current average rate of
tU = 23.2%). In contrast to the current state, the tax applies uniformly to all ﬁrms,
corporate and non-corporate.
63. Deduction of a normal rate of return on equity, equal to a long-run average of the
risk free return on government bonds.
4. A proportional “shareholder” tax tS at the personal level on all types of capital
income (interest, dividends, and realized capital gains). A surcharge on realized
capital gains is charged to compensate for the interest gains due to tax deferral





= 1−tL to avoid tax arbitrage by misdeclaration of owners’ wages
(and, thus, becomes tS = 18.3%). The shareholder tax allows full loss oﬀset.
Losses may be carried forward over unlimited periods and carried backwards
over a limited time span.
5. Adjustment of the value added tax to balance the government budget.
Allowance for corporate equity (ACE) As a third pillar, SDIT introduces an al-
lowance for corporate equity (ACE) which is the single most important measure to
remove the tax obstacles for growth and provides a widespread stimulus to domestic
and multinational direct investment at home. It decisively strengthens the country’s
attractiveness for international direct investment and strengthens its position in inter-
national tax competition. The pillar sets the eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on
investment to zero and reduces the eﬀective average tax rate (EATR) to a major extent.
TheACEsystemwasdevelopedandshowntobeneutralwithrespecttoinvestment
byBoadwayandBruce(1984), waspopularizedbytheInstituteforFiscalStudies(1991)
and discussed in the light of uncertainty by Bond and Devereux (1995). The basic idea
is to extend the tax deductibility of interest on business debt to a normal return on
equity as well. Bond and Devereux (1995) ﬁnd that no more than a risk free normal
return equal to the net of tax return on government debt is called for. In allowing for
7tax deduction of all costs of ﬁnance, the ACE system makes the proﬁt tax neutral with
respect to investment and also avoids the tax distortion in favor of debt ﬁnance. Under
an ACE system, the proﬁt tax exempts a normal return on capital but continues to tax
in a non-distortive way a supernormal return on capital. Apart from the tax neutrality
with respect to investment and debt equity choice, the allowance substantially reduces
the average tax rate on proﬁts. The lower tax burden is the mirror image of the revenue
losses incurred by the government.
We believe that the recent literature on international taxation provides a good the-
oretical rationale for the structure of the SDIT system. Most importantly, the optimal
taxation analysis of Gordon (1986) and Razin and Sadka (1991) implies that a country
should optimally set its source taxes to zero if it can use other taxes to ﬁnance a given
expenditure. This does not at all imply that the corporate tax should be eliminated.
Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000) show that the same can be achieved by using a cash-
ﬂow tax which sets the EMTR at the ﬁrm level to zero but retains a positive statutory
tax rate that allows to tax economic rents. The ACE allowance under the SDIT scheme
is an alternative way to set the EMTR to zero and achieves the same. The role of the
statutory tax rate is to tax rents and supernormal proﬁts. Huizinga and Nielsen (1997)
have emphasized that a positive rate also helps to tax domestically generated rents
that accrue to foreigners under foreign ownership of domestically operating ﬁrms and
thereby helps to shift income from foreigners to domestic citizens. Under the SDIT sys-
tem, a positive tax rate is also needed to prevent income shifting from labor to capital
income. The size of the tax rate at the ﬁrm level is further constrained by the fact that
a too high rate relative to the statutory tax rates in other countries might induce proﬁt
shifting by multinational ﬁrms.
Another important aspect of the ACE allowance is that it also sets the EATR on
investments with a normal return to zero and much reduces it for projects with a
8supernormal return. Since the discrete location decisions of multinational ﬁrms are
dominated by the average tax burden, as Devereux and Griﬃth (1998) have shown,
the ACE system should help to attract inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and also
reduce outward FDI by domestic multinationals. It is sometimes objected that the ACE
allowance leaves normal returns tax free but imposes a positive EATR on projects with
supernormal returns. It thus discriminates against the most proﬁtable investments,
oftenimplementedbytechnologicallyadvancedmultinationalcorporations. However,
the reduction of the EATR is also a major beneﬁt to the most proﬁtable ﬁrms relative to
the status quo. Furthermore, the same objection applies to any other tax scheme that
is neutral with respect to marginal investments such as the cash-ﬂow tax. Finally, a
country’s ability in using tax incentives to target the most proﬁtable ﬁrms compared
to less proﬁtable ones is rather limited. As Keen (2001) and Devereux, Griﬃth, and
Klemm(2002)argue, specialtaxregimesareprobablytheonlypossibilitytospeciﬁcally
target the more proﬁtable, internationally mobile ﬁrms. If this is not possible, the only
way to attract them is to keep the EATR and, thus, the statutory rate low.
DualIncomeTaxation Byimplicationofthe ﬁrst andfourthpillar, SDIT combines
progressive wage taxation with a ﬂat tax rate on capital income. Thereby, the share-
holder tax is deﬁned as a moderate but comprehensive ﬂat tax on all types of capital
income. Apart from being administratively simple and avoiding a lot of problems in
corporate personal tax integration, the shareholder tax is central to the SDIT proposal







inates the incentives for tax arbitrage by misdeclaration of owners’ wages as capital
income. This is considered as the Achilles heel of the Nordic dual income tax5 which
5See Sørensen (2003). Fjærli and Lund (2001) provide empirical evidence. Lindhe, S¨ odersten, and
¨ Oberg (2004) analyze the implications for diﬀerent organizational forms.
9necessitates complicated and administratively expensive schemes to avoid it.When an
entrepreneur appropriately declares her personal contribution to the ﬁrm’s earnings as
a wage, no proﬁt tax applies to this income but the owner must pay the top wage tax
at a rate tL, leaving him with net earnings 1 − tL. If she pays no wage, her contribution
to the ﬁrm’s earnings inﬂates proﬁts. Since these proﬁts result from the entrepreneur’s
labor input, no cost of equity can be deducted. Hence, they show up as a supernormal
return on equity capital and get taxed at the company level at a rate tU, and subse-
quently at the personal level at a rate tS. When this supernormal return eventually






which is equal to what the entrepreneur would receive if she
had declared a wage.6 Consequently, SDIT avoids the opportunity for tax arbitrage by
misdeclaration of owners’ wages.
Second, SDIT ensures a low tax burden on all forms of savings. It substantially
reduces the double taxation of savings inherent in the current income tax and thus
represents an important step towards a consumption oriented tax system. At the
personal level, the optimal tax literature suggests that the relative size of labor and
capital income tax rates should reﬂect the tax sensitivity of savings and labor income
(see Huizinga (1995) for a simple statement). Given the fact that a large part of labor
supply is rather inelastic, this argument calls for a lower personal tax rate on capital
income. The choice of tax rates, however, is further constrained by the need to prevent
income shifting from labor to capital income. Depending on the chosen tax rate at
the company level, the personal tax rate cannot be too low. Third, given unchanged
taxation abroad, the low rate on personal capital income reduces the incentives for
outward portfolio investments and helps to contain capital ﬂight. At least part of these
foreign portfolio investments will escape domestic taxation of foreign source income
6If the entrepreneur’s personal tax rate is smaller, she can always obtain the ﬁrm’s income in terms
of a wage and thereby avoid a too high tax on proﬁts.
10under the residence principle.
Fourth, and more importantly, the comprehensive and uniform ﬂat tax rate ensures
tax neutrality at the personal level with respect to ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. Similar to
Auerbach (1991), the shareholder tax contains a surcharge to correct for the compound
interest gains as a result of tax deferral under the realization principle and leads to an
accruals equivalent capital gains tax rate equal to the dividend tax rate.7 This feature
roughlyassuresholdingperiodneutralityandallowsforeﬃcient riskdiversiﬁcationof
portfolio investors. Apart from this, it equates the eﬀective tax rates on dividends and
capital gains, thereby eliminates the tax bias against proﬁt distributions and equates
the costs of capital from retained earnings and new equity. It is often argued that tax
neutrality towards payout behavior contributes to improved capital market eﬃciency.
The tax thus encourages ﬁrms to pay out proﬁts and to compete with other ﬁrms on
the capital market for new equity. This should help to improve the eﬃciency of the
capital market in allocating scarce capital towards the most productive investments.
Furthermore, given a uniform tax rate on interest and the return to equity, SDIT also
ensures tax neutrality at the personal level with respect to ﬁrms’ debt equity choice.
Since all types of ﬁrms are treated uniformly on both the company and personal level,
theSDITsystemisbyconstructionneutralwithrespecttochoiceoforganizationalform.
Finally, SDIT ensures full loss oﬀset and thereby encourages risk taking on account of
the Domar Musgrave eﬀect. According to Gordon (1998), Cullen and Gordon (2002)
and Sørensen (2003), this insurance eﬀect of a proportional tax with full loss oﬀset
should favor small domestic ﬁrms where entrepreneurs are exposed to substantial
undiversiﬁed risk, and thus should reduce the risk premium and encourage growth.
Although not accounted for in our quantitative model, this advantage must not be
neglected for an overall evaluation of the reform proposal.
7See Keuschnigg (2004a) for an administratively simple approach and detailed calculations.
11Value added tax The SDIT proposal will lose tax revenue. The most important
reasons are that it exempts a normal return on equity from the proﬁts tax and roughly
halves the current tax rates on interest and dividend income in Switzerland. The more
eﬀective capital gains taxation will not generate much revenue since the tax base is
very narrow. We consider two alternative scenarios to ﬁnance the revenue losses. One
is to raise the value added tax to balance the revenue losses. SDIT clearly shifts the tax
burden from capital towards labor. In eroding the real wage, the economic costs will
show up in an added labor supply distortion. As an alternative scenario, we will also
consider cuts in lump-sum transfers to the private sector (subsidies to agriculture and
industry, social transfers etc.) to see how much the eﬃciency gains from the increased
neutrality of capital income taxation are oﬀset by the extra labor market distortion. In
the Swiss context, the two scenarios are also motivated by the fact that the value added
tax with a normal rate of 7.6% is far below the European average, leading to a much
lower share of indirect taxes in Switzerland compared to other countries. Further, the
size of the government sector and, in particular, social transfers have grown much
more than average in the last decade. As a matter of fact, the growth of the government
sector in Switzerland was among the highest of all OECD countries. Many economists
and policy makers call for a reversal of the trend.
3 Quantitative Assessment
3.1 The Need for Tax Reform and the Current Tax System
Switzerland is among the richest countries in the world. However, over the past 30
years, it has lost much of its lead position. While per capita income in 1970 was 74%
higher than the OECD average, the diﬀerential shrinked to only 16% in 2002. It is only
12marginally ahead of its neighboring countries Austria, France, Germany, and Italy.
No other OECD country experiences net outﬂows of foreign direct investment as high
as Switzerland (OECD (2004)). While the country has traditionally applied moderate
taxes on the personal and corporate level, it did not react to the trend towards lower
tax rates abroad, see Devereux, Griﬃth, and Klemm (2002). Currently, a rather limited
reform proposal that intends to reduce the double taxation of dividends and to achieve
a more eﬀective taxation of capital gains on company shares is discussed in the political
process.
Table 1 reports the current structure of Swiss tax rates.8 In the status quo, wages,
interest payments, dividends and proﬁts of noncorporate ﬁrms are all subject to the
personal income tax at the same rate. The rate of 37.3% represents the upper end of
the progressive tax schedule. Capital gains on movable private property including
shares in corporate ﬁrms are, in principle, tax exempt. An exception to this rule are,
for example, individuals classiﬁed as professional traders who must declare realized
capital gains as part of their taxable income. We assume that about 20% of capital
gains are subject to the income tax and that tax deferral under the realization principle
reduces the eﬀective tax rate to .58 of the statutory rate, see OECD (1991). Thus, the
eﬀective capital gains tax rate for corporate shares is .2 × .373 × .58 = 4.3%. In contrast,
capital gains realized upon selling or transferring noncorporate ﬁrms are fully taxed.
Average holding periods are much longer, resulting in a reduction factor of .41 on
account of larger interest gains. Noncorporate ﬁrms thus face a much higher eﬀective
taxrateof.373×.41 = 15.3%onrealizedcapitalgains. However,sinceretainedearnings
of noncorporate ﬁrms are zero by deﬁnition, capital gains taxes are less important for
these ﬁrms.
8Cantons and municipalities of the Swiss federation autonomously choose tax rates on personal and
corporate income, resulting in pronounced tax diﬀerentials across regions. Focusing on the structure of
the tax system, we form an average of the top tax rates on personal and corporate income and weigh
them together using cantonal GDP.
13Tax on Status Quo SDIT
DC NC DC NC
Proﬁts 23.2% 37.3% 23.2% 23.2%
Allowance for equity no no yes yes
Capital gains 4.3% 15.3% 18.4% 18.4%
Dividends 37.3% — 18.4% 18.4%
Interest 37.3% 37.3% 18.4% 18.4%
Wages 37.3% 37.3% 37.3% 37.3%
Value added 7.6% 7.6% — —
Property 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Note: DC: Domestic Corporations. NC: Noncorporate Firms.
Table 1: Tax rates in Switzerland: Status Quo vs. Swiss Dual Income Tax (SDIT)
Figure 1 shows eﬀective marginal tax rates (EMTR) on investment by source of
ﬁnance, and separately for domestic corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms. EMTRs mea-
sure the size of the overall tax wedge between the ﬁrm’s pretax rate of return and the
net of tax return of an investor in percent of the pretax return. They aggregate the
impact of all ﬁrm level and personal taxes as well as tax depreciation rules. A higher
tax wedge indicates a higher distortion against savings and investment.
The Swiss tax system distorts on several important margins. Corporate taxation in
Switzerland follows the classical system where proﬁts are ﬁrst taxed at the corporate
level and, if distributed, are taxed again as dividends. This double taxation contrasts
withtheeﬀectivetaxexemptiononcapitalgains. Sincethereturnoninternallyﬁnanced
investments consists of lightly taxed capital gains, it bears a very low EMTR of 33.4%.
Alternatively, corporations may pay out proﬁts and ﬁnance investment externally with
new equity. Using this strategy, the return on investment ﬁnanced with new equity
consists of dividends which are subject to double taxation. For this reason, the EMTR
on new equity is much higher, equal to 58.5%. The strong tax bias against dividends
and external risk capital has left its mark on the typical ﬁnancial structure of Swiss
corporations. Most ﬁrms retain their earnings in order to save the dividend tax and










































































Figure 1: Eﬀective marginal tax rates on investment: Status Quo versus SDIT
In deﬁning the macroeconomic impact of the dividend tax, our model adheres to
the old view of dividend taxation and assumes that the cost of equity ﬁnancing is a
weighted average of the dividend and capital gains tax rates. The dividend payout
ratio serves as weight for the impact of the dividend tax. Taking a payout ratio of
.4, the average tax on equity on the the personal level is .4 × .373 + .6 × .043 = 17.5%,
see Table 1, and determines the EMTR for equity in the back row of Figure 1. In
the literature, there is no consensus upon the role of dividend taxes. Under the new
view of dividend taxation, ﬁrms ﬁnance marginal investment with retained earnings
so that the double taxation of dividends becomes irrelevant for capital accumulation,
see Auerbach (2002) for a summary of the literature. Recently, Chetty and Saez (2005)
emphasized the interaction of agency problems and dividend payments. They argue
that higher dividend taxes induce big ﬁrms to keep excessive amounts of capital. In
addition, new ﬁrms facing start-up costs and having to make an initial capital infusion
will have to raise new equity initially and thus anticipate future dividend taxes, see
Sinn (1991) and the further development by Dietz (2003). Both ideas imply that the
15dividend tax distorts capital accumulation.
Looking at the three sources of ﬁnance separately, the Swiss tax system is seen to in-
ducethefamiliarhierarchyofﬁnanceorpeckingorderofﬁnancialsources. Comparing
the cost of debt with the weighted cost of equity, Figure 1 indicates a moderate tax bias
of about two percentage points in favor of debt ﬁnanced investments. However, this
non-neutrality is the net eﬀect of two larger distortions on the company and personal
level, see Miller (1977). Interest on business debt is deductible from the corporate tax
basis while the opportunity cost of equity is not. This asymmetric tax treatment creates
a strong incentive for debt usage on the corporate level. Since long, corporate ﬁnance
experts have identiﬁed the tax deductibility of interest payments as a major advantage
of debt over equity. Although the relationship was never denied, empirical studies
have for a long time failed to prove the relationship. Taking account of the identity of
the marginal investor and the corporate tax status to calculate ﬁrm speciﬁc marginal
tax rates, recent empirical research has conﬁrmed the eﬀect of taxes on debt usage.9
The personal tax rate on equity is an average of dividend and capital gains tax rates.
Since capital gains are largely untaxed in Switzerland, the weighted tax rate on equity
falls short of the interest tax. Putting corporate and personal taxes together, equity
pays the full corporate tax and a reduced tax on the personal level. Interest income, in
contrast, escapes the corporate tax on account of tax deductibility but is fully taxed on
the personal level. For non-corporate ﬁrms, proﬁts are taxed only once so that there is
no double taxation. As before, interest on debt is subject to the interest tax. Since proﬁt
tax and interest tax coincide, see Table 1, there is no distortion between debt and equity.
The investment incentives by personal and corporate ﬁrms determine the sectoral
9MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) ﬁnd that ﬁrms adjust leverage towards higher debt usage
in response to increases in the corporate tax rate. Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) identify a
relation between the level of corporate debt and their simulated tax rates. Gordon and Lee (2001) provide
additional evidence. Graham (2003) summarizes the empirical strategy and discusses further literature.
16allocation of capital. Weighing together the EMTRs for debt and equity ﬁnanced in-
vestments by the average ratio of debt to total capital, we obtain the EMTR of total
investment with mixed ﬁnancing. Taking a debt asset ratio of roughly .28 for corpora-
tions, their total EMTR amounts to .72×.437+.28×.408 = 41.3%. Comparing this to the
EMTR of 41.8% for noncorporate ﬁrms indicates that, on average, the Swiss tax system
is largely neutral with respect to organizational form. Note, however, that the average
numbers tend to mask a considerable heterogeneity across ﬁrm sizes. In reality, ﬁrms
tend to switch from personal to corporate status when they start becoming bigger.
These ﬁrms must rely much more on external risk capital, i.e. new equity which bears
a much higher tax load under corporate form. Our average calculation may understate
the distortion of organizational choice.
The front row of Figure 1 plots the marginal eﬀective tax rates on investment that
resultfromimplementingtheSDITproposal. Quiteobviously, theSDITreformentirely
eliminates the tax distortions by source of ﬁnance or by choice of legal form. The small
visiblediﬀerencesstemfromthediﬀerentsizeoftheequitypremium(fourpercent)and
the intermediation margin on business debt (three percent). More importantly, the size
of the EMTRs are uniformly reduced on account of the investment neutrality on the
ﬁrm level. The remaining tax wedge and size of EMTRs are due to moderate taxation
at the personal level, consisting of the shareholder tax under SDIT and the wealth tax.
3.2 Analytical Arguments
We start with a core version of our numerical model to highlight the main transmission
channels and to build intuition for the most important economic impact deriving from
introducing SDIT. The next subsection presents numerical results.
17TheInvestor’sPerspective: Savingscaneitherﬂowintoequityorintointerestbearing
assets such as business and government debt. Suppose that debt pays a ﬁxed market






















An equity investment V yields dividends D subject to dividend taxation at rate tD, and
capital gains ˙ V−VN net of capital gains taxes at an eﬀective rate of tG. Capital gains on
outstanding shares are equal to the total increase ˙ V in ﬁrm value less new share issues
VN. The right hand side of (1) is the net of tax return on the ﬁrm value.
Corporate Firms: By the cash ﬂow identity (2), inﬂows consisting of proﬁts π, new
equity VN, and new debt N = ˙ B, must equal outﬂows in the form of dividends and
investment spending I = ˙ K. For simplicity, this section ignores depreciation of the
capital stock K. Adhering to the old view of dividend taxation we assume in (3) that
dividends are chosen as a ﬁxed fraction θ of the total return to investors.10
D + I = π + VN + N, (2)
D = θ  
￿
D + ˙ V − VN
￿
. (3)
Using (3), one can integrate the no arbitrage condition (1) subject to a transversality
constraint. Firm value equals the present value of future net dividends D − VN, see
(4). The net dividend ﬂow is discounted using the cost of equity which is the required
gross return r prior to the personal tax tE on equity income. The cost of equity r
10The simulation model includes an equity premium that declines with a higher payout ratio θ as
in Poterba and Summers (1985). Dietz and Keuschnigg (2004) analyze formally how payout policy
responds to taxation. This paper focuses on the debt-equity choice, instead.







i. The personal tax on equity is an average of the dividend




(Ds − VNs)exp(−r   (s − t))ds, (4)
r =
1 − tB
1 − tEi, t
E = θt
D + (1 − θ)t
G. (5)
The capacity to pay dividends depends on proﬁts net of the proﬁt tax at rate τ,
π = f (K) − (i + m)B − τ
￿
f (K) − (i + m)B −     (K − B)
￿
, (6)
where f (K) ≡ maxL F(K,L) − wL denotes maximized revenues net of wages resulting
fromoptimalemploymentLthatishiredatawagew. Proﬁtsarefurtherreducedbythe
interest cost on outstanding debt B, consisting of an ‘agency cost of debt’ m and interest
payments to investors at rate i, and by the tax liability resulting from the proﬁts tax.
Interest payments are tax deductible. The tax base would be further reduced if ﬁrms
were allowed to deduct an imputed cost of equity at rate   on the value of equity.12
Excessive debt leverage comes at a cost. Several theories have rationalized why
ﬁrms use only limited amounts of debt despite of its tax advantage. Since ﬁrm owners
are protected by limited liability, they will ﬁnd it optimal to declare bankruptcy of the
11See equations (2.5) and (2.11) in Auerbach (2002) who discusses the implications of the new and
old views of dividend taxation for the cost of equity. In our simulation model, we assume that total
dividends D = ¯ D + DR decompose into an exogenous distribution ¯ D plus a variable dividend DR that
is linked to total returns as in (3) by an endogenously determined payout ratio θ. The constant part
¯ D implies that total dividends are rather stable, reﬂecting the empirical result ever since Lintner (1956)
that ﬁrms adjust dividends slowly to new information. Maybe more importantly, the basic dividend
reduces the variable part DR which lowers the value of the payout ratio θ needed to match the model
with aggregate dividend payments. This reduces the weigth of the dividend tax in the cost of equity and
allows us to control for the importance of the new view versus the old view in our simulation analysis.
12Following Hayashi (1982), it can be shown that V + B = K. Thus, total ﬁrm value K is equal to the
value of equity V and debt B.
19ﬁrm more often if the debt load is higher. Consequently, bankruptcy costs have to be
paid more frequently.13 For the same reason, owners of highly leveraged ﬁrms might
prefer to engage in higher risk, see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977). In
addition, collateral of ﬁrms might be suﬃcient to satisfy debt owners for low leverage
ofaﬁrmandmakeﬁrmbondsalmostriskless. Increasingthedebtloadwillthenstretch
collateral over a growing amount of debt making it more and more risky. Last, in a
pecking order model of ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy, debt issues signal bad quality compared
to internal ﬁnancing of investments, see Myers and Majluf (1984). When debt investors
anticipate these problems, they request a premium m that increases with leverage as
measured by the debt asset ratio b = B/K such that their return i net of bankruptcy costs
remainsconstant. Ontheotherside,alimiteddebtloadmightbebeneﬁcialtocorporate
governance since the ﬁxed repayment tends to discipline managers, see Jensen (1986).
To sum up, ﬁrms pay interest i + m while investors only receive i. We assume that
the agency costs of debt ﬁnancing depend on the debt ratio, are globally convex and
minimized for some natural debt ratio b∗. Formally,
m(b
∗) = 0, m
′ (b
∗) = 0, m
′′ (b) > 0, b ≡ B/K. (7)
Investment and ﬁnancial policies follow from value maximization subject to (2), (6)
and (7). The Hamiltonean is H = (1 − τ)
￿
f (K) − (i + m)B
￿
+ τ (K − B) − I + N + qI +
λN. Given shadow prices of capital and debt, q and λ, the optimality conditions for
investment I and new debt N are q = 1 and λ = −1. In the absence of adjustment costs
relating to changes in capital or debt, the shadow prices immediately jump to their
steady state values, implying ˙ q = ˙ λ = 0. The costate equations thus yield conditions
13See e.g. Bond and Meghir (1994) or Auerbach (2002).
20for optimal levels of capital and debt,
K : r = (1 − τ)
h
f
′ (K) + b
2m
′i
+ τ , (8)
B : r = (1 − τ)[m + bm
′] + τ  + (1 − τ)i. (9)
For easier interpretation, we rewrite (9) and deﬁne a ‘preference for debt ﬁnance’ ∇:
∇ ≡
r − τ  − (1 − τ)i
1 − τ
= m + bm
′. (10)
If debt and equity are treated equally on the personal level, then the pretax returns
must also be identical, r = i. Interest deductibility at the company level, however,
creates a positive preference for debt equal to ∇ = τi/(1 − τ). Firms could save on
ﬁnancing costs and thereby raise ﬁrm value by substituting expensive equity by cheap
debt. However, more debt adds agency costs of d(mB)/dB = m+bm′. The optimal debt
asset ratio is found when the tax preference for debt is oﬀset by the extra agency costs.
In the absence of taxes, or with full ﬁnancial neutrality of taxes, the debt preference is
eliminated, implying a natural debt asset ratio b∗ on account of (7).
Using (9) to replace bm′ in (8), we ﬁnd that the user cost of capital is an average of
the tax adjusted costs of equity and debt which are weighted by the debt asset ratio,
f
′ (K) = b   [i + m] + (1 − b)  
r − τ 
1 − τ
. (11)
The ﬁrm equates the marginal product of capital to its user cost. In a steady state, a
fraction b of the capital stock is ﬁnanced with debt and the remaining share 1 − b with
equity. The user cost weighs together the relevant costs of equity and debt.14
14For a similar result, see Fuest, Huber, and Nielsen (2003). In their work, a fraction b of ﬁrms is debt
ﬁnanced and a fraction 1 − b is equity ﬁnanced. Here, ﬁnancing shares reﬂect a representative ﬁrm.
21Non-Corporate Firms: With non-corporate ﬁrms, all proﬁts are considered as part
of the entrepreneur’s income which is subject to the income tax once. Under current
tax law, the tax rate τ must be interpreted as the entrepreneur’s income tax, without
any further dividend tax, tD = 0. As Table 1 indicates, the SDIT system instead taxes
proﬁts at the company level by the general proﬁt (corporate) tax at rate τ and again
at the personal level at the uniform rate tS such that the cumulative tax burden of
(supernormal) proﬁts is equal to the top wage tax rate.15 With all proﬁts being private
income, retained earnings are zero by deﬁnition. Investment is thus ﬁnanced by new
equity and debt. Hence, VN = I − N and D = π in (2). Inserting in the no-arbitrage
condition (1), one obtains rV = 1−tD
1−tGπ + N − I + ˙ V with r = 1−tB
1−tGi. Consequently, the
Hamiltonean turns out as H = 1−tD
1−tGπ+N −I +qI +λN. After a number of now familiar
steps, the solution of the optimization problem eventually results in
∇ ≡
1−tG
1−tDr − τ 
1 − τ
− i = m + bm
′, r =
1 − tB
1 − tGi, (12)
f
′ (K) = b   [i + m] + (1 − b)  
1−tG
1−tDr − τ 
1 − τ
. (13)
Neutrality of SDIT: The shareholder tax as part of SDIT is levied at a uniform, ﬂat
rate tS on all types of capital income at the personal level, tD = tG. Since SDIT includes
a surcharge to compensate for the interest gains from tax deferral under the realization
principle, it equates the dividend tax rate with the accruals equivalent capital gains tax
rate. The tax rate on equity as listed in (5) thus becomes independent of the dividend
payout ratio θ. In other words, SDIT is neutral with respect to the dividend payout
policy of ﬁrms and treats retained earnings and new equity on an equal footing.
In addition, SDIT also equates the tax rates on interest and equity income, tE = tB,
15Technically, the status quo is represented by τ equal to the personal income tax rate and tD = 0.
Under SDIT, τ is reduced to the general proﬁts tax while tD is set equal to the share holder tax tS.
22and therefore treats equity and debt fully neutral at the personal level. Consequently,
the cost of equity becomes equal to the market rate of interest, r = i, as is evident from
(5). To achieve neutrality, the equal treatment of equity and debt must also be extended
to the company level which is achieved by allowing tax deductibility of the imputed
cost of equity. Setting the cost of equity equal to the market rate of interest (on safe
bonds)onaccountoftheuniformshareholdertax, theappropriateallowanceisequalto
the market rate of interest,   = r = i, which is ﬁxed by the residence principle of interest
taxation to the world interest rate. Substituting into (10) shows that SDIT entirely
eliminates the distortion in the debt asset ratio, ∇ = 0. Firms will accordingly choose
the natural leverage b∗ as in the absence of taxation which minimizes total agency costs
bm(b). The ﬁnancial neutrality of SDIT is reﬂected in Figure 1 by the equal heights of
the EMTRs.16
The most important advantage of SDIT is its investment neutrality. Since the ACE
system allows for a tax deduction of all costs of ﬁnance, including both debt and an
imputed cost of equity, it entirely eliminates the investment wedge. With   = r, the
proﬁt tax disappears from the user cost of capital in (11), f ′ (K) = b∗  [i + m]+(1 − b∗) r.
Noting r = i by uniform taxation at the personal level, and m(b∗) = 0 on account of
neutrality towards ﬁnancial decisions, SDIT is seen to be fully neutral with respect to
investment. The user cost of capital is equal to the world rate of interest, f ′ (K) = i.
The SDIT tax system is also neutral with respect to ﬁnancing and investment of
non-corporate ﬁrms since these ﬁrms are treated exactly the same as corporations. The
entrepreneur’s income tax τ is now set equal to the general proﬁts tax while returns in
terms of consumed proﬁts and realized capital gains are taxed at the uniform (accruals
equivalent) rate of the shareholder tax, tD = tG = tS, which also applies to interest
income, tB = tS. Therefore, (12) implies r = i and ∇ ≡
r−τ 
1−τ − i. Taking account of
16The small diﬀerences are due to the diﬀerences in the risk premia on equity and debt.
23the allowance for equity at a rate   = r shows that SDIT is neutral with respect to
the entrepreneur’s debt equity choice, ∇ = 0. The same substitutions in (13) yield
f ′ (K) = i if the agency cost is zero at the optimally chosen debt asset ratio. SDIT
is thus neutral with respect to investment and, by implication, also with respect to










Moving from the Status Quo to SDIT: With our simple partial equilibrium approach
that takes the market interest i as given, we can already indicate some key adjustments
followingtheimplementationoftheSDITreform. First,thereformcompletelyremoves
the initial tax bias tD > tG against corporate distributions. Since the shareholder tax
equates the eﬀective tax rates, the dividend payout ratio signiﬁcantly increases.
We can anticipate the eﬀects of SDIT on debt asset ratios by considering the debt
preference ∇ in (10). Figure 1 indicates a small debt preference of corporations which
is the net result of equity being favored on the personal level and debt being favored
on the company level. Removing the tax distortion should reduce the debt asset ratio
slightly. Moving to SDIT will tend to strengthen the equity base of companies.
We have argued earlier that interest on debt is taxed more heavily at the personal
level than the average return to equity. Since all assets must yield the same net return,
the personal tax preference for equity implies a cost of equity smaller than the cost of
debt, r < i, see (5) and the tax rates listedin Table 1. On the other hand, the introduction
of ACE removes the tax wedge on investment at the company level which reduces the
user cost of capital. The second eﬀect is much more important, making the EMTRs
fall signiﬁcantly in Figure 1. SDIT substantially reduces the user costs of capital and
thereby promotes investment.17
17By the envelope theorem, the eﬀect of the tax reform on the optimally chosen debt asset ratio does
243.3 The Simulation Model
Assessing the quantitative eﬀects of a far reaching tax reform obviously requires a
general equilibrium model of the economy. The stylized analysis of the preceding sub-
section reﬂects only the bare bones of the rich economic structure of our computational
model. We brieﬂy state the most important additional model features.18
Savings: Household decisions are based on an overlapping generations model in the
traditionofBlanchard(1985)withthelevelofsavingsfollowingfromthe intertemporal
consumption choice of individual households. The model is extended to allow for
endogenous labor supply and portfolio composition of savings. Household sector









￿  subject to a budget constraint19
GΠ ¯ At+1 =
￿
1 + ¯ ı
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Our assumption that within period preferences C − ϕ(l) are additively separable be-
tweenconsumptionandeﬀortcostofworkexcludesintertemporalsubstitutioninlabor





1 + tI wt. (15)
not inﬂuence investment. The diﬀerential of (11) yields f′′dK =
h




  db + (1 − b)   d
r−τ 
1−τ .
The square bracket disappears when the debt asset ratio is optimally chosen as in (10). The formula also
shows, however, that allowing for debt ﬁnance is very important for a meaningful quatitative analysis
since the impact of proﬁt taxation is scaled down by the size of the debt asset ratio: f′′dK = (1 − b) d
r−τ 
1−τ .
18A complete documentation of the model (Keuschnigg (2004b)) is available upon request.
19The notation refers to σC = 1/
￿
1 −  
￿
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, C consumption, l labor
supply, ρ subjective discount factor, β survival probability, and ϕ(l) is a convex increasing eﬀort cost
function. The model includes exogenous productivity and inﬂation trends but is presented in detrended
form where G is one plus the rate of productivity growth and Π is one plus the inﬂation rate. In the
budget, ¯ A is accumulated savings, ¯ ın net of tax portfolio return, w wage rate, TH lump-sum transfers, tL
and tI are the rates of wage and indirect taxes.
25PortfolioComposition: Thelong-runlevelofaccumulatedsavings ¯ Aismainlydriven
bytheaveragenetoftaxportfolioreturn¯ ın anddisposablelaborincome. Thesimulation
modelrealisticallyallowsforsmallreturndiﬀerentialsamongimperfectlysubstitutable
assets. Savings can be invested in domestic and foreign government debt, domestic
and foreign business bonds, equity of domestic corporate and noncorporate ﬁrms,
and in internationally traded shares of domestic and foreign multinational ﬁrms. The
composition of savings follows from endogenous portfolio choice that reﬂects among
other aspects the typical home bias in international portfolio investments. Similar to







end of period wealth derived from investing in alternative assets. Portfolio preference
is maximized by asset choice subject to the budget condition ¯ A =
P
i Ai. Preferences are
of the linear homogeneous CES type and introduce a portfolio diversiﬁcation motive
using a constant elasticity of asset substitution σA. The solution yields asset demand
functions that are proportional to overall portfolio wealth. Further, when the net
of tax return of asset Ai increases relative to a “rate of return index” of other assets,
agentsdemandmoreofthistype. Havingsolvedfortheoptimalportfoliocomposition,
the average portfolio return ¯ ın which guides the households’ intertemporal decisions,
follows by deﬁnition of
(1 + ¯ ı








Domestic savings ﬂow into home and foreign assets and foreign investors demand
home issued assets which leads to international cross ownership of assets.20 Invoking
the ‘small’ open economy assumption, foreign rates of return and the overall level of
foreign savings are beyond the inﬂuence of Swiss investors and therefore exogenous.
Thus, foreign demand for domestically issued assets reﬂects only a substitution eﬀect
20This connects to recent contributions on international taxation emphasizing the implications of
crossownership, see Devereux (2004), Huizinga and Nielsen (1997), Keen and Ligthart (2005) and Slem-
rod, Hansen, and Procter (1997), among others.
26when interest rates change at home. Domestic rates of returns must adjust to clear
the relevant asset markets. For example, domestic business debt is issued by domestic
corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms as well as the domestic subsidiaries of home and
foreign based multinationals. The interest rate iB must adjust to equate the supply
of business debt with demand by home and foreign investors. Similarly, iG denotes
the market clearing interest rate on domestically issued government debt. Equity of
domestically owned corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms is non-traded and similarly
yields a market clearing rate of return. Finally, equity of multinational ﬁrms are
traded on international stock markets where a perfectly elastic foreign demand ﬁxes
the gross rate of return. In this case, domestic personal taxes cannot inﬂuence the gross
return which is thus exogenous from the home country’s viewpoint. An increase in
domestic dividend and capital gains taxes will only reduce the net returns and thereby
depress domestic demand for these shares, see Devereux (2000). Multinational ﬁrms
are inﬂuenced only by a change in the domestic corporate or proﬁt tax, see Figure 2.21
Multinational Investment: Our model is unique in representing the large hetero-
geneity of ﬁrms. Diﬀerent ﬁrms respond rather diﬀerently to business taxes which is
mostly overlooked in existing quantitative studies of tax reform. We distinguish four
types of ﬁrms: domestically owned corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms and domestic
subsidiaries of home and foreign based multinational companies. Asymmetric eﬀects
enter on account of our assumption that the return to equity gross of personal taxes is
endogenous for domestically owned ﬁrms (with non-traded equity) but is exogenous
for internationally traded shares of multinationals. The marginal investor of a multi-
national ﬁrm is assumed to be tax exempt or not subject to domestic income taxes.
21In Figure 3, uc (um) are user costs of domestic (mutlinational) corporations while re,c (re,m) refer to
the cost of equity gross of personal taxes. Further, te,i and te,s denote the eﬀective tax rates at the ﬁrm and
personal level and refer to the investment and savings wedges.
27Figure 2: Tax wedges on savings and investment
Tax changes at the personal level aﬀect the user costs of domestic ﬁrms but have no
inﬂuence on multinationals. A reduction in corporate taxes stimulates investment by
all ﬁrms and, in particular, multinational investment, see Figure 2. In addition, our
modelallowsforproﬁtshiftingthroughtransferpricingofmultinationals. Itincludesa
ﬁxed factor for each sector, thereby giving rise to limited rents and supernormal proﬁts
thatcontinuetobetaxedwiththeproﬁtstaxdespiteofthedeductionofanormalreturn
on account of the tax allowance for equity. Finally, the four types of ﬁrms compete on
a common domestic labor market and pay the same wage. For this reason, tax policy
may lead to crowding out among ﬁrms. If an investment stimulating policy beneﬁts
multinationalﬁrmsrelativelymorethandomesticones,theirextralabordemandmight
crowd out employment by domestic ﬁrms.
Net Foreign Wealth: Given the investment and consumption choices of intertem-
porally optimizing agents with perfect foresight, the home economy’s current account
28reﬂectsthediﬀerentialtrendsinsavingsandinvestmentathomeandeventuallyresults
in an endogenously adjusted net asset position.
Parameters: Model calibration starts by calculating long run averages of the required
data series of the Swiss economy. The model is then calibrated to replicate these
averages as a stationary equilibrium. We set the international interest rate to i = 4%,
the inﬂation rate to 1%, the growth rate of technology to 1.8% and the rate of capital
depreciationto10%. Thecomputationalmodelembedsavarietyofbehavioralmargins
that are parameterized to reﬂect the econometric evidence. In particular, we are careful
tomodeltheﬁnancialdecisions. Incalibratingthedebtequitychoice,wefollowGordon
and Lee (2001) who estimate that a decrease in the corporate tax by 10% points which
reduces the tax advantage of debt will reduce the debt asset ratio by three to four
percent. We model an explicit payout policy along the lines of Poterba and Summers
(1985) and Poterba (2004). They estimate the likely response of the payout ratio to a
change in the relative tax treatment of dividends and capital gains. We further use the
results of Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) to calibrate the response of the
equity premium to a (tax induced) change in the payout ratio.
Labor supply responds to changes in real wages with an elasticity of ǫL = .5 which
reﬂects the consensus of the current doctrine, see Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba (1998),
andisconﬁrmedforSwitzerlandbyLeuandKugler(1986). Theintertemporalelasticity
of substitution in consumption is set to σ = .5, see Kydland and Prescott (1982) or
Hansen and Singleton (1983). Microeconometric results of Hall (1988) indicate lower
values which, however, might stem from hidden heterogeneity, see Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002). The survival probability of the Blanchard model is β = .95. We use a constant
elasticityofsubstitution(CES)productionfunctionwithanelasticityofcapitaldemand
with respect to the cost of capital approximately equal to unity. Again this seems to be
29a consensus value, see Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba (1998), and is supported by recent
empirical evidence surveilled in Hassett and Hubbard (2002). We provide a sensitivity
analysis to check the robustness of results with respect to key behavioral parameters.
3.4 Long-run Eﬀects
Table 2 reports the long-run eﬀects of a stepwise cumulative introduction of the SDIT
reform. The ﬁrst lines document the tax parameters that identify the type of scenario.
Thediﬀerentcolumnsare”BCase”fortheinitialsteadystatepriortoreformand”STAX”
for the shareholder tax, a dual income tax which eliminates distortionary taxation on
the personal level between dividends and capital gains and personal and corporate
sector. ”INT” extends the shareholder tax to interest income and ”SDIT” reports the
results of the complete SDIT scenario by additionally introducing the ACE allowance
for the opportunity cost of equity.
In all three scenarios, we keep a constant GDP share of government spending and
a constant ratio of government debt to capital. The budget is balanced by adjusting
the value added tax. Government debt thus increases along with capital accumulation.
This shifts the tax burden, to some extent, to future generations which tend to gain
the most from any growth enhancing policy. The last column ”SDITLS” sets back the
indirect tax to the base case value and ﬁnances with a cut in lump-sum transfers. This
scenario helps to gauge the extra labor supply distortion that is introduced by shifting
the tax burden from capital to labor by means of an increase in the value added tax.
STAX: The ﬁrst step extends the corporate tax to non-corporate ﬁrms and at the same
time replaces existing taxation of equity returns on the personal level by a ﬂat uniform
tax at a reduced rate. For corporations, dividend and eﬀective capital gains tax rates
30Variable BCase STAX INT SDIT SDITLS
  Allowance for equity no no no yes yes
tU Proﬁt tax 23.22 23.22 23.22 23.22 23.22
tS Shareholder tax 37.32 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36
tB Interest tax 37.32 37.32 18.36 18.36 18.36
tI Indirect tax 7.60 9.24 10.42 11.70 7.60
b Av. debt ratio 30.61 31.52 33.25 29.45 29.20
θc Payout ratio, dom.corp. 40.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00
uc User cost, dom.corp. 9.60 10.28 10.00 8.52 8.75
rc Cost of equity, dom.corp. 8.68 9.22 9.00 9.60 9.84
iBH Interest on bus. debt 9.83 9.72 8.74 7.98 8.24
¯ ı Av. portfolio return 5.26 5.42 5.73 5.80 5.93
w Market Wages %) -0.53 0.58 3.68 2.94
wh Net Wages %) -2.02 -1.99 -0.13 2.94
Ls Employment %) -1.02 -1.00 -0.06 1.46
K Aggregate Capital %) -2.51 -0.07 8.18 8.62
GDP Gross Dom.Product %) -1.39 -0.72 2.34 3.42
C Priv. Consumption %) -0.96 1.63 3.53 4.13
A Total Assets/GDP 4.10 4.30 4.65 4.68 4.53
NFA Net For. Assets/GDP 0.65 0.70 0.97 0.94 0.84
Note: %) Percentage changes. Other values are absolute. BCase: Base
Case. STAX: Dual Income Tax sets tD = tG equal to tS = .184 for corpo-
rations and introduces the proﬁt tax combined with the shareholder tax
tS for non-corporate ﬁrms. INT: Reduction interest tax. SDIT: Allowance
for Corporate Equity. Residual public ﬁnance with VAT, lump-sum only
in scenario SDITLS.







taxation of dividends is thus eliminated while capital gains get more eﬀectively taxed
at the accruals equivalent rate equal to tS. The negative eﬀects mainly originate from
the more eﬀective taxation of capital gains. Up to now, capital gains on shares are very
much tax favored, see Table 1. Given the payout ratio of θ = .4, equation (5) yields a
weighted tax rate on corporate equity of tE = .4 × .373 + .6 × .043 equal to 17.5% which
nowrisesto18.4%,therateoftheshareholdertax. Consequently,thesavingstaxwedge
increasesandeventuallyresultsinaslightlyhigheroverallEMTRandhigherusercosts
of capital. Non-corporate ﬁrms are not much aﬀected. The STAX scenario essentially
31replacestheentrepreneurs’incometaxbyseparateproﬁtandshareholdertaxationwith
an overall tax burden equal to the top personal income tax rate. In fact, this scenario
also eliminates a small surcharge to the income tax of about two percentage points
that stems from unfavorable treatment of entrepreneurs in the pension system which
should not be part of a system of capital income taxation. Thus, entrepreneurial ﬁrms
beneﬁt moderately in this scenario. Investment incentives of multinational ﬁrms are
notdirectlyaﬀectedbytheshareholdertax,seeFigure2. Sincetheirmarginalinvestoris
assumedtobenotsubjecttodomestictaxes,thegrossreturnonequityisinternationally
ﬁxed. A change in personal taxes will only aﬀect the savings wedge and thus inﬂuence
domestic demand for shares of multinationals. Finally, the scenario loses considerable
tax revenue on account of roughly halving the dividend tax while the capital gains tax
increase is narrowly based and cannot make up for the losses. The value added tax
must be accordingly raised which erodes the real wage and discourages labor supply.
Clearly, the ﬁrst scenario encourages savings, although selectively, since it favors
investments in equity over interest bearing assets and therefore triggers portfolio ad-
justments, see Table 3. The average net of tax portfolio return increases from 5.26 to
5.42% and induces a 3.4% increase in ﬁnancial wealth.22 As the dividend tax cut sub-
stantially raises corporate ﬁrm values, investors must allocate a larger share of their
savings to these assets. The value of equity holdings in domestically owned corpora-
tions increases by 8.14%. To induce these extra asset demand, investors must be oﬀered
a higher net return which increases signiﬁcantly from 2.46 to 3.08%. Even though the
tax rate tE on corporate equity increases only to a minor extent, the increase in the
required net return to investors inﬂates the cost of equity listed in Table 2, rising from
8.68 to 9.22%, and ultimately ends up in the user cost of capital rising substantially
22In Table 3, the average net of tax portfolio return ¯ ı includes the exogenous “risk premia” on equity
and debt, equal to 4 and 3 percent. The net return in,j for each asset states the net, “certainty equivalent”
return without premium. These are equal to 2.46% across assets in the initial equilibrium while the
average portfolio return is higher, indicating that the premium also gives rise to extra asset income.
32to 10.28%. Now, the macroeconomic eﬀects are straightforward. Higher user costs
of domestic corporations discourage investment, thereby reducing capital intensity by
ˆ K − ˆ L = −2.51+1.02 = −1.5% and market wages by −.53%.23 Since the value added tax
must be raised by more than 1.6 percentage points, the net of tax real wage declines
much more sharply by −2%. Labor supply and employment shrink by 1% which
magniﬁes the negative eﬀect on capital accumulation (−2.5%). GDP and consumption
must fall as well. Reﬂecting the net eﬀect of a higher portfolio returns and reduced net
wages, the induces savings lead to a minor increase in net foreign assets. The scenario
also changes the ﬁnancial behavior in the business sector. Since the shareholder tax,
including an accruals equivalent capital gains taxation, entirely eliminates the tax bias
against dividends, the payout ratio rises from 40% initially to the ‘natural’ rate of 55%
that ischoseninthe absence ofanytax distortion. Onaverage, ﬁrmsprefer to relymore
on new debt as a source of investment ﬁnancing. The average debt asset ratio increases
by almost one percentage point. The reason is that the cost of equity for domestic
corporations increases while the market rate of interest (including the risk premium on
debt) slightly declines. Debt becomes relatively more attractive, see (10).
INT: Column ”INT” extends the shareholder tax rate of 18.36% to interest income
which is approximately half of the initial rate of 37.32%. The tax cut increases returns
to interest bearing assets speciﬁcally and the average portfolio return in general. This
boosts savings and adds a 12.55% increase to household ﬁnancial wealth, see Table 3.
The expansion of savings raises demand for all assets, but mostly ﬂows into interest
bearing assets. For example, the demand for domestic and foreign issued business
debt expands signiﬁcantly more than the level of overall savings. The same holds
for domestic demand of foreign government debt which can be bought at a constant
23The hat notation refers to a percentage change, i.e. ˆ K ≡ dK/K.
33Ass. BCase STAX INT SDIT SDITLS
Aj/ ¯ A in,j ˆ Aj in,j ˆ Aj in,j ˆ Aj in,j ˆ Aj in,j
¯ A 100.00 5.26 3.39 5.42 12.55 5.73 16.90 5.80 14.18 5.93
AVC 17.58 2.46 8.13 3.08 12.27 2.90 21.24 3.39 19.10 3.58
AVN 22.42 2.46 2.98 2.58 6.50 2.36 9.06 2.30 6.88 2.47
AmH 8.27 2.46 9.78 3.24 16.01 3.24 19.46 3.24 15.17 3.24
AmF 2.00 2.46 8.14 3.08 14.27 3.08 17.67 3.08 13.45 3.08
ABH 7.54 2.46 1.11 2.39 18.25 3.43 14.67 2.81 12.85 3.03
ABF 20.52 2.46 1.79 2.46 22.04 3.76 25.67 3.76 21.16 3.76
AGH 12.70 2.46 -2.30 2.04 0.89 1.80 9.31 2.32 9.54 2.72
AGF 8.97 2.46 1.79 2.46 14.62 3.11 18.03 3.11 13.79 3.11
Note: Netassetratesofreturnin,j (netofalltaxesandnetofequitypremium)
are absolute, and net of the wealth tax at rate tW: iVC = rVC − tW or iGH =
(1−tB)iGH −tW. Column BCase reports asset shares in total portfolio wealth
¯ A,theothercolumnsgivepercentagechangesofdemandfortypesofassets.
Asset demand is for equity of domestic corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms
(AVC and AVN), equity of home and foreign based multinationals (AmH and
AmF), home and foreign issued business debt (ABH and ABF), and home and
foreign issued government debt (AGH and AGF).
Table 3: Portfolio Structure
foreign interest rate. Since the supply of domestically issued public debt is tied to
capital accumulation by assumption, and since demand tends to increase in line with
the growth of overall portfolio wealth, the market rate of interest on public debt must
fall to ration demand. The declining domestic interest induces foreigners to shift away
from this asset, leaving domestic demand to increase 0.9%. Halving the interest tax
wedge allows for a higher net return to savers (with the exception of government debt)
and simultaneously a lower gross interest rate to ﬁrms.
To sum up, the required net return on equity tends to fall and that on debt tends
to rise as investors reallocate their portfolio towards interest bearing assets. For both
reasons, we ﬁnd in Table 2 a lower cost of equity and a lower interest cost of debt,
declining to 9 and 8.74%, respectively. As equation (11) demonstrates, both eﬀects
strengthen investment incentives for domestic ﬁrms, corporate and non-corporate.
Multinationals beneﬁt only from the lower interest on the domestic cost of debt since
34the cost of equity is ﬁxed on international stock markets. Now, the economy’s average
capital intensity increases rather than declines as in the preceding scenario, and the
market wage goes up by .58%. Since the interest tax cut again loses revenue, indirect
taxes have to be increased further by more than one percentage point. The net of tax
real wage remains constant despite of the higher gross wage and employment is still
smaller by one percent compared to the base case which again leads to a signiﬁcant
loss of GDP by −0.72%. Aggregate consumption, however, expands by a remarkable
1.6% in the long-run which results from larger ﬁnancial income out of a higher level
of savings that also earns a higher average portfolio return. A considerable part of the
extra savings is invested internationally and thereby results in a net asset position of
almost hundred percent of GDP.
Note ﬁnally that the cut in the interest tax is required for a neutral treatment of debt
and equity at the personal level. Viewed in isolation, it induces more debt leverage of
ﬁrms. Equations (10) and (5) show that a cut in the interest tax raises the net interest
and, along with it, the opportunity cost of equity. As it makes debt more attractive on
the personal level, the interest tax cut raises the debt preference of ﬁrms. Consequently,
the debt asset ratio must increase, compared to the preceding scenario. The tendency
for increased leverage is reinforced by the asset market adjustment which reduces the
gross interest on business debt by a full percentage point while the cost of equity falls
only be a relatively minor extent.
SDIT: The eﬀects of the complete scenario are reported in column ”SDIT”. Viewed
in isolation, the last step introduces a tax allowance equal to the opportunity cost of
equity. In the simplest case portrayed in equations (10) and (11), the imputed cost of
equity is equal to the market rate of interest on debt (  = r = i) and must, in general, be
endogenously determined. As the neutrality discussion in section 3.1 shows, the tax
35allowance serves two important functions. First, it eliminates the investment wedge
for all types of ﬁrms and, second, it extends the equal treatment of debt and equity at
the personal level to the company level. In making both ﬁnancing costs tax deductible,
SDITisnowfullyneutralwithrespecttodebtequitychoice. Comparedtothepreceding
scenario, the average debt asset ratio thus falls by 4 percentage points to 29.45%, and
still declines by 1 percentage point if compared to the status quo. The cost of this
initiative is that it reduces the proﬁt tax liability to zero for ﬁrms that earn no more
than a normal rate of return and thereby again loses considerable tax revenue which
requires a further increase in indirect taxes. In long-run equilibrium, the value added
tax rate would have to increase by a full 4 percentage points, up from 7.6 to 11.7%.
Introducing ACE substantially cuts the average tax burden and raises ﬁrm values
by 20% for domestic corporations and 9% for non-corporate ﬁrms. To induce the re-
quired portfolio reallocation, investors must be oﬀered a higher net return on domestic
corporate equity, see Table 3, which, in turn, raises the cost of equity. The elimination
of the investment wedge allows at the same time a remarkable decline in the user cost,
falling from 9.6 to 8.5% compared to the status quo. User costs fall for all types of ﬁrms,
yielding an economy wide investment boom. In the long-run, the capital stock is up
by more than 8%. The higher capital intensity pushes up the market wage by 3.7%
and eliminates the decline in the net real wage caused by the preceding steps. The
decline in labor supply is reversed and employment is roughly the same as under the
status quo. Since the labor force no longer shrinks, capital accumulation is much more
eﬀective in raising GDP. Private consumption increases by a full 3.5%.
Table4showsthediﬀerentialimpactofthefulltaxreformondomesticandmultina-
tional ﬁrms. The ﬁrst line documents the sectoral employment shares in the domestic
labor force. Switzerland is home to quite a number of world renowned multinational
ﬁrms employing a remarkable 22% of the labor force. Domestic corporations and non-
36DC NC Mh Mfh
SQ SDIT SQ SDIT SQ SDIT SQ SDIT
Labor share 48.00 30.00 15.70 6.30
EMTR Total 43.71 47.84 51.77 46.96
28.64 30.03 29.41 25.28
EMTR Saving 28.93 17.63 39.12 33.05
28.64 30.03 29.41 25.28
EMTR Investment 20.79 36.68 20.78 20.78
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt ratio 28.04 39.86 29.06 29.06
28.39 35.98 26.91 26.91
User cost of capital 9.60 10.36 10.00 10.00
8.52 7.50 7.92 7.92
Cost of equity 8.68 7.63 9.00 9.00
9.60 8.57 9.00 9.00
Labor demand % −4.07 −2.64 12.21 12.15
Capital stock % 2.18 7.09 22.57 22.50
Production % −1.77 −0.31 14.90 14.84
Note: %) Percentage changes. Other values are absolute. DC: Domestic Corpo-
rations. NC: Noncorporate Firms. Mh: Domestic multinationals at home. Mfh:
Foreign Multinationals at home. SQ: Status Quo. SDIT: Full dual income tax
scenario SDIT.
Table 4: Results by Sector
corporate ﬁrms employ 48% and 30% of total labor, respectively. The table reveals that
theaggregateresultsofTable2maskaconsiderableheterogeneityintheresponseofthe
business sector. For variables that are stated in absolute values, the upper left number
is the rate in the status quo and the lower right number reports the same ﬁgure after
the SDIT reform. The numbers for the debt ratio and user costs of capital are found
again in Table 2 for domestic corporations, the cost of equity links to Figure 2.
The cost of equity for multinationals are determined on international stock markets
and are thus beyond the inﬂuence of domestic tax policy. The cost of equity for
domestic ﬁrms increases quite signiﬁcantly. The reduced personal taxation of foreign
source interest income results in higher net of tax returns on these assets where pretax
37returns are internationally ﬁxed, see Figure 2. By a similar eﬀect, the dividend payout
ratio of the very large multinational ﬁrms tends to be higher than with domestic
ﬁrms. The dividend tax cut is thus weighed more heavily than the capital gains
tax increase. Consequently, the tax reform reduces the eﬀective personal tax tE =
θtD+(1 − θ)tG onreturnstomultinationalsharesandtherebybooststhenetreturnquite
signiﬁcantly as Table 4 veriﬁes by the reduction in the EMTR on savings. With a high
degree of asset substitutability, the net return on domestic equity must again increase.
Without any compensating shrinking of the tax rate tE for home corporations (which
slightly increases, in fact), the cost of equity is pushed up as well. For this reason, the
investmentstimulusisconcentratedmorewithmultinationalﬁrmsratherthanwiththe
domestic sector. Since all ﬁrms compete in the same labor market, an above average
expansion of one type of ﬁrms must come at the expense of other ﬁrms. The table
shows that multinational ﬁrms end up crowding out employment by domestic ﬁrms
quite considerably. Weighing together the sectoral percentage changes in employment
with the sectoral employment shares yields the macroeconomic employment eﬀect in
Table 2: −4.07 × .48 − 2.64 × .3 + 12.21 × .157 + 12.15 × .063 = −.06%.
SDITLS: The last scenario recomputes the eﬀects of the complete SDIT proposal, but
adjusts lump-sum taxes on households instead of the value added tax to make up for
the lost tax revenue. This yields two main consequences. First, it avoids the extra
distortion against labor supply since income at the margin becomes independent from
hours worked. Gross and net real wages thus increase by the same percentage, i.e.
2.94%. This stimulates additional labor supply and expands employment by 1.46% in
the long-run and facilitates the macroeconomic expansion.
Second, lump-sum ﬁnancing reduces disposable income. Aggregate savings grows
bylessandthenetportfolioreturnmustincreasebymoreinordertoelicitthenecessary
38savings. Since foreign rates of interest are ﬁxed and capital income tax rates remaining
unchanged, highernetreturnstranslateintohighermarketratesofinterestondomestic
business debt and a higher cost of equity. The user costs of capital rise and thereby
retard investment to a moderate extent. Despite of the extra employment, the capital
stock grows by only half a percentage point more than in the main SDIT scenario. The
capital intensity thus falls relative to SDIT, explaining the smaller increase in the gross
wage. The extra employment and the moderately stronger capital accumulation result
in a substantially more vigorous expansion of GDP. Aggregate consumption swells by
no less than 4 percent relative to the status quo. Finally, the smaller savings response
also translates into a more moderate increase in the net foreign asset position.
3.5 Transitional Eﬀects
The SDIT proposal shifts the tax burden from capital to labor income. The growth
eﬀects from eliminating the tax wedge on investment and reducing it on savings yield
substantial long-run income gains while the increase in the value added tax (VAT)
needed to make up for the revenue losses dominates the short-run picture. Instanta-
neous budget balancing would dictate an immediate increase in the VAT rate to 17.4%
which is more than double the initial value of 7.6%. Figure 3 plots the time path of the
required VAT rates. Higher indirect taxes erode the real wage and rather immediately
impair employment. Since capital is predetermined in the short-run, the unfavorable
employment response leads ﬁrst to a contraction of GDP before the investment led
expansion takes hold. As Figure 4 illustrates, GDP ﬁrst falls by 2% before it starts to
growatrapidratesintheearlyadjustmentperiod. Thegainsfromcapitalaccumulation
thus arrive with a signiﬁcant lag of several years. Typically, empirical studies ﬁnd that
it takes about eight years to achieve half of the long-run eﬀects. As the induced capital
39Figure 3: Value Added Tax: Periodic Budget Balancing Versus Tax Smoothing.
accumulation proceeds, the short-run loss is turned into a GDP gain only after more
thanadecadeandeventuallyresultsinanincreaseof2.34%asreportedinTable2. GDP
growth swells the tax bases and generates extra revenue so that an ever lower VAT rate
suﬃces to assure periodic budget balance. The long-run VAT rate is 11.7% which is 5.7
percentage points lower than the short-run value reported in Figure 3. Together with
the increase in gross wages, the lower VAT rates essentially eliminate the short-run
employment losses.
The distributional implications of this adjustment pattern are obvious and largely
apply to any growth oriented tax reform.24 The gains to labor in terms of employment
prospects and higher wages arrive only with a considerable delay while the gains
to capital are felt immediately. Tax capitalization and the higher returns to capital
in the transitional period lead to instantaneous increases in asset prices and windfall
proﬁts beneﬁting the owners of old capital in place. With SDIT, these capital gains get
24Keuschnigg(1994)discussesintergenerationalreditributioneﬀectsresultingfromtheseadjustments.
40eﬀectively taxed once they are realized, with a surcharge on the interest gains from tax
deferral until realization. It must be emphasized that these windfall gains are not to be
avoided because they are a reﬂection of the investment incentives needed to promote
growth. Nonetheless, the unfavorable short-run GDP and employment losses of the
reform naturally call for some strategy to smooth the gains and costs of tax reform
intertemporally and across generations.
An alternative to periodic budget balance is to balance the budget intertemporally,
allowingdeﬁcitsearlyonandrunningsurplusesinthefuturesuchthataconstantvalue
added tax rate is sustained. This scenario thus accumulates substantial government
debt and is called ”tax smoothing” in reference to the real business cycle literature,
see Lucas, Jr. and Stokey (1983). The tax rate must be endogenously computed and
turns out to be 15.1% which is lower than the short-run but higher than the long-run
rate under periodic budget balancing, see Figure 3. Reﬂecting the implications of the
VAT for labor supply, the tax smoothing scenario signiﬁcantly dampens the short-run
employment and GDP losses. As Figure 4 shows, GDP falls by only 1.6%, instead of
2% under periodic budget balancing. The mirror image of the short-run eﬀects is that
the tax smoothing scenario also dampens the long-run gains of the reform since the
VAT rate must be higher to serve the public debt accumulated in the early adjustment
period. GDP grows by only 1.47% instead of 2.34%.
To isolate the extra distortion that is introduced by the higher VAT rate, we run
an alternative scenario of cutting lump-sum transfers. In Switzerland, the size of the
public sector has grown considerably over the last decades, and social transfers have
been the most rapidly growing expenditure category. The key implications of cutting
(lump-sum) transfers are that it reduces disposable private income and the scope for
savings but also avoids the labor supply distortion of the VAT. Social transfers do not
aﬀect the returns on an extra hour of work at the margin. In reality, a reduction in
41Figure 4: GDP Under Alternative Budget Financing Strategies.
social transfers might even have favorable eﬀects on labor market participation since it
widens the income diﬀerential between work versus non-work and, thus, sharpens the
incentives for job search. Our model neither captures these work incentives nor is it
abletoappropriatelytakeaccountoftheunfavorableredistributionwithingenerations.
Our model framework thus implies that lump-sum transfer cuts avoid the short-run
reduction in employment and GDP. Furthermore, the gross wage gains resulting from
capital accumulation boost labor supply and employment which, in turn, magniﬁes
the investment induced expansion of GDP. Figure 4 illustrates.
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
While important qualitative insights can be derived from theory, the magnitudes are
alwayssensitiveanddependonkeyelasticitiesthatdeterminethebehavioralresponses
of individuals and ﬁrms to tax changes. Our base case parameters reﬂect consensus
42estimates of the empirical literature. Quite often, however, these parameters are es-
timated rather imprecisely in the econometric literature, leaving a substantial range
of equally credible values. The key behavioral parameters used are discussed in the
last paragraphs of section 3.2. Table 5 summarizes the results of a sensitivity analysis.
Column”SDIT”reproducestheresultsofthemainscenarioinTable2. Weﬁrstconsider
the elasticity of capital demand with respect to the user cost of capital which is equal
to 1 in the main case. A lower value of ǫK = 0.75 naturally reduces the impact of a tax
reform that reduces the cost of capital. The capital stock increases only by 6.2% instead
of 8.18% in the base case, and the gains of the tax reform in terms of long-run GDP
and consumption are somewhat smaller. The next column recomputes the main SDIT
scenario with a low elasticity of labor supply, using a value of 0.25 instead of 0.5. The
results are almost identical to the standard case. The reason is that the SDIT reform
results only in a small variation of the net wage of −0.13% which cannot give rise to
a larger labor supply eﬀect, irrespective of the magnitude of the elasticity. However,
a lower wage elasticity of labor supply would dampen the labor supply response of
a lower value of σC as in the next column. It would also signiﬁcantly dampen the
short-run decline in GDP reported in Figure 4 which mainly results from the reduction
in labor supply in response to the initial increase in the value added tax. The reform
would be less costly in the short-run in this case.
Given that SDIT substantially strengthens savings incentives, the intertemporal
substitution elasticity becomes a prime candidate for a sensitivity check. It turns out
to be the most important parameter in determining the magnitude of the results. The
empirical estimates support both higher and lower values than our base case value of
.5. Using a higher elasticity value of σC = 0.65 strongly magniﬁes the long-run eﬀects of
thereform. Whenthesavingsresponseismoreelastic, asmallerincreaseintheaverage
portfolioreturnalreadysuﬃcestoelicittherequiredassetaccumulation. Consequently,
43Variable SDIT ǫK ǫL σC σC  
ǫK Elasticity capital demand 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ǫL Elasticity labor supply 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50
σC Intertemp. subst. elast. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.35 0.65 0.50
σC Intertemp. subst. elast. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.65 0.50
  Asset subst. elasticity 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.00
uc User cost, dom.corp. %) 8.52 8.52 7.48 8.73 8.37 8.66
iBH Interest on bus. debt %) 7.98 7.88 7.96 8.21 7.82 7.84
¯ r Av. portfolio return %) 5.80 5.78 5.79 5.93 5.72 5.74
ti Rate of indirect tax %) 11.70 11.62 11.59 13.16 10.71 11.64
w Market Wages %) 3.68 3.71 3.71 3.34 3.92 3.62
wh Net Wages %) -0.13 -0.03 0.00 -1.74 1.00 -0.13
Ls Employment %) -0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.87 0.50 -0.06
K Aggregate Capital %) 8.18 6.20 8.33 6.25 9.54 8.06
GDP Gross dom.prod. %) 2.34 1.80 2.42 1.29 3.07 2.29
C Priv. Consumption %) 3.53 3.44 3.68 1.54 4.92 2.85
YC Output Corporate Sec. %) -1.77 -1.10 -1.57 -4.37 0.03 -2.83
YN Output Noncorporate Sec. %) -0.31 -0.22 -0.30 -0.54 -0.16 0.16
Yh Output home multis %) 14.90 10.83 14.81 16.11 14.08 16.41
Yfh Output foreign multis %) 14.84 10.79 14.75 16.01 14.05 16.32
Note: %)Percentagechanges. Othervaluesareabsolute. Residualbudgetﬁnancing
with VAT. ǫK elasticity of capital demand, ǫL elasticity of labor supply, σC intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution,   elasticity of portfolio substitution.
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis
the SDIT scenario leads to smaller interest rates and returns to equity for domestically
issued assets which leads to smaller user costs, larger investment, higher wages and
larger employment. Aggregate private consumption increases by almost, 5% instead
of 3.5% in the base case parameterization. Note further, that only domestically owned
ﬁrms can beneﬁt from lower equity costs since the cost of equity of multinationals is
ﬁxed on international stock markets. Consequently, this scenario reduces the crowding
out eﬀects on the labor market and shifts the macroeconomic expansion away from the
multinational towards the domestic sector. Obviously, a lower elasticity generates the
opposite eﬀects and much reduces the gains from the reform.
Last, we cut the elasticity of portfolio substitution   in half, making asset demand
44less sensitive to interest rate diﬀerentials and increasing the home bias.25 Households
shift less to foreign assets if the return at home declines. Consequently, domestic
interest rates can ﬂuctuate to a larger extent in response to a given shock. For example,
the interest on domestically issued business debt declines by more than in the base
case scenario. However, domestic investors are also less willing to shift their portfolio
demand towards equity of home ﬁrms where the tax cuts raise ﬁrm values the most.
Consequently, the return to domestic equity rises considerably in order to induce
the required change in portfolio composition. Cheaper debt encourages investment,
especially by multinationals, while a higher cost of equity, only for domestic ﬁrms,
retardsinvestment. AsTable5shows,multinationalsexpandevenmorewhiledomestic
corporate ﬁrms, the largest sector of the Swiss economy, gets crowded out to an extent
that results in a smaller increase of the macroeconomic capital stock. Except for the
decline of private consumption, the macroeconomic impact is very limited, however.
4 Conclusions
This paper has laid out a proposal for fundamental capital income tax reform that
eliminates much of the investment and savings distortion. The reform combines a
speciﬁc version of the Nordic dual income tax with an allowance for corporate equity
(ACE system). The proposed system eliminates the investment wedge at the company
level since all costs of ﬁnance for both debt and equity are tax deductible from the
proﬁts tax. A normal rate of return is tax exempt but the proﬁts tax continues to tax
an excess return to capital such as monopolistic proﬁts or rents. The proposed system
not only eliminates the marginal eﬀective tax rate on investment, but also substantially
25Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) explain the home bias eﬀect by asymmetric information about foreign
investmentopportunities. Theyarguethattheelasticityofsubstitutionbetweenhomeandforeignassets
should be high in capital exporting countries such as Switzerland, see our base case calibration, and
lower in capital importing countries.
45reduces the average tax burden. Firms that earn no more than a normal return on
capital, do not pay any proﬁt taxes at all. Since the average tax rate is more important
for the location decision of multinational ﬁrms, the reform is also a decisive step to
increase the attractiveness of Switzerland as a location of multinational investment.
At the personal level, a comprehensive, ﬂat tax on all forms of capital income at
a moderate rate is suggested. The rate is chosen to avoid misdeclaration of entrepre-
neurial wage income as low taxed capital income which is a common problem of the
dual income tax. The low tax rate roughly halves the existing tax rates on interest and
dividend income but also implies a more eﬀective taxation of capital gains. This low
tax rate introduces a powerful savings incentive. The system was shown to be neutral
with respect to investment, ﬁnance, and organizational choice and much reduces the
savings distortion. It was suggested that revenue losses are ﬁnanced with a value
added tax, or a reduction in transfer spending.
A quantitative evaluation based on a detailed computational growth model of the
Swiss economy with domestically owned corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms and do-
mestic production of home and foreign based multinationals has shown substantial
long-run gains, amounting to a permanent increase of GDP between 2.3 and 3.5 per-
cent. However, the need to ﬁnance the revenue losses with an increase in the value
added tax imposes considerable short-run costs on account of an increased labor mar-
ket distortion. The detrimental labor market eﬀect could be avoided though if the
reform were ﬁnanced by a cut in transfer expenditure. The dynamic simulations have
also reminded of the long time span needed until the larger part of the income gains
become eﬀective. A strategy of intergenerational income shifting by using public debt
tosmooththerequiredvalueaddedtaxratesovertimecouldreducetheshort-runcosts
of the reform but would also signiﬁcantly reduce the long-run gains.
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